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This article investigates the corporate con-
trol mechanism that operates in commercial
banks. The term corporate control mechanism
refers to the various methods by which bank
owners attempt to force bank management to
follow value-maximizing policies. Various de-
vices can motivate such managerial discipline.
External devices—the market for takeovers, ex-
ternal capital, and the final output of the firm—
can all in theory discipline managers by threaten-
ing them with replacement or bankruptcy of their
firm. Internal devices consist of direct monitor-
ing performed by boards of directors and large
shareholders and the management compensa-
tion contract, which can provide incentives to
maximize value by giving managers equity-like
shares in the firm. This article analyzes the use of
some of these corporate control devices in banks.
Although the research on the corporate
control mechanism in nonfinancial firms is vast,
there is surprisingly little research on the corpo-
rate control mechanism operating in banks. Yet
analysis of the corporate control mechanism in
banks is important for a number of reasons. First,
despite its supposed decline in recent years,
banking remains an extremely important indus-
try that acts as the main interface between savers
and investors.
Second, such analysis contributes to our
understanding of the different ways in which
corporate control mechanisms operate in firms
under different legal and regulatory environ-
ments. The considerable differences between
the legal and regulatory environment of banks
and nonfinancial firms may imply substantial
differences in the nature and effectiveness of
their respective corporate control mechanisms.
In particular, federal and state restrictions on
the market for corporate control for banks and
the oligopolistic advantages that commercial
banks have in issuing insured debt may mean
that important external market mechanisms for
disciplining managers—the takeover and prod-
uct market—are significantly weaker for banks.
The regulatory environment of the commercial
banking industry may substitute to some degree
for the weaker market mechanisms of corporate
control. However, intervention by the regulatory
authorities is widely regarded as a poor, more
costly substitute for market control mechanisms,
both because of bureaucratic and political prob-
lems that interfere with the efficient functioning
of regulatory agencies and because maximiz-
ing shareholder value (the objective of market
mechanisms) is not the same as minimizing the
probability of failure (the regulator’s objective).
This article addresses the question of whether
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these differences in the regulatory environment
of banks relative to nonfinancial firms have pro-
duced greater reliance on internal devices for
corporate control—active boards and large,
active shareholders—or, if not, whether the cor-
porate control problem is simply more severe
in commercial banking.
Third, such analysis may provide infor-
mation on whether commercial banks suffered
from a corporate control problem in the 1980s,
as some researchers have recently proposed
(Gorton and Rosen 1992). Many analysts claim
that over the past ten to fifteen years, the U.S.
commercial banking industry has suffered a sig-
nificant decline in performance, including a loss
in market share to nonbank competitors (such
as securities markets, mutual funds, insurance
companies, finance companies, and foreign
banks), substantial falls in bank profitability, and
a skyrocketing bank failure rate.1 All this has
occurred despite intense merger and acquisition
activity among banks that was supposed to im-
prove productivity and cost efficiency. Many
researchers believe that the reasons for this de-
cline are secular in nature and that the recent
recovery in bank profitability will prove to be
only a temporary phenomenon, with commercial
banking continuing to decline relative to other
financial institutions over the long term.
Researchers have proposed numerous
reasons for the commercial banking industry’s
woes in the 1980s. Greater competition from
nonbanks and a heavier federal regulatory bur-
den are often put forward as reasons for this
apparent decline.2 Others point to the moral
hazard problems that appear particularly severe
in the banking industry.3 This article addresses
another possible reason for the relative under-
performance of banks: that the corporate control
mechanism in commercial banks is less effective
than in nonbank firms.
Finally, from a public policy viewpoint,
examination of the corporate control mecha-
nism in banks may be useful in evaluating the
industry’s current legal and regulatory environ-
ment and also some of the recently proposed
banking legislation that may amend or eliminate
provisions in the Glass–Steagall Act. While much
of the current and proposed legislation has
been evaluated in terms of the desirability of
allowing commercial banks to engage in securi-
ties underwriting or in selling insurance, there
has been little analysis in terms of the effects on
the corporate control mechanism that operates
in banks, even though some of the proposed
changes in banking law would loosen the restric-
tions on bank ownership, with potential effects
both on the structure of bank ownership and the
bank takeover market. In this article, I attempt
to provide such analysis.
I analyze the corporate control mechanism
in U.S. commercial bank holding companies
(BHCs) over the period 1987–92 using data on
the number of managers versus outsiders on
a BHC’s board of directors; the ownership
structure of the BHC, including directors’ share-
holdings and the stakes of the BHC’s largest
shareholders; and various measures of bank
performance. I relate these variables to five
types of corporate control change a BHC could
undergo over the sample period: hostile take-
over, friendly acquisition, removal of top man-
agement by the board of directors, intervention
by regulators, and no control change. I use these
data to examine the relative importance and
effectiveness of the different methods of disci-
plining managers in BHCs and how they differ
from those employed in nonfinancial firms.
Some questions this article addresses are,
What are the primary means by which managers
are disciplined in commercial banks? What is
the frequency and effectiveness with which
these means are used? For example, what is the
frequency of top management turnover in com-
mercial banks? Is turnover related to measures of
bank performance? How important are boards of
directors in disciplining top management relative
to alternative control devices such as hostile
takeovers, friendly acquisitions, and intervention
by regulators? What is the structure of ownership
in commercial banks, and is it related to bank
performance? As mentioned above, many of these
questions have been addressed for U.S. non-
financial firms (see, for example, Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny 1989 and Jensen and Murphy 1990),
so some standards are available with which
results for the banking sector can be compared.
This study borrows in particular the method
employed in Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989)
for their sample of manufacturing firms.
In the next section of this article, I outline
the factors that are unique to the commercial
banking sector that may affect the nature and the
effectiveness of its corporate governance mecha-
nism, and I survey the academic research on
corporate governance problems in commercial
banks. The subsequent section describes the
data and discusses the empirical results. The
final section concludes.
The corporate control mechanism
in commercial banks
Does the legal and regulatory environ-
ment of U.S. commercial banks today imply a26
system of corporate governance different from
that observed in other sectors of the economy?
Many unique factors in the commercial bank
operating environment may influence the nature
and effectiveness of the corporate control mecha-
nism in commercial banks.
The first unique factor is federal regulation
of the takeover market. The threat of a takeover
of a firm, in which management usually is re-
placed, can discipline managers to act in the
interests of shareholders. Restrictions on the
type or number of potential acquirers of the
firm make takeovers less likely and thus limit
the credibility of the takeover threat. In the
banking sector, there traditionally have been
significant restrictions on the takeover market.
For example, the Bank Holding Company Act
(as amended in 1970) and the National Banking
Act generally require that the acquirer of a com-
mercial bank also be a commercial bank or
bank holding company—mergers between
nonbank corporations and commercial banks
are prohibited—and there are more general re-
strictions on the ownership of banks by non-
financial corporations.
In addition, federal regulation may make
permitted hostile takeovers within the commer-
cial banking sector much more expensive and
time consuming than in nonbank sectors of the
economy. Interstate banking regulations may,
for example, prohibit many possible bank merg-
ers. In addition, bank takeovers typically face
extensive delays. This tendency may lower the
frequency of hostile takeovers, which typically
depend for their success on the ability to close
the transaction quickly. Bank takeovers require
prior approval from one of the three federal
bank regulators—the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC), or the Federal Reserve Board—and
state authorities (Baradwaj, Fraser, and Furtado
1990). After approval is granted, there is a thirty-
day waiting period so the Justice Department
can scrutinize the takeover attempt. In all, the
takeover process can last four months or longer.
In many cases, these restrictions may make the
threat of a takeover in commercial banking in-
sufficient to discipline managers.
Such restrictions may also influence the
ownership structure of commercial banks. Cur-
rently, nonfinancial corporations and firms in
important financial sectors such as the insurance
industry are prohibited from owning commer-
cial banks. To a large extent, the law restricts own-
ership of commercial banks to individuals and
other commercial banks. To the degree that this
restriction reduces the likelihood that banks will
have equity holders with large stakes at risk, it
also may reduce the effectiveness of one mecha-
nism of corporate control: the monitoring and
oversight performed by shareholders motivated
by their large holdings.
Another unique factor is the effect of de-
posit insurance on the moral hazard problem in
banking. As is the case with any limited liability
firm with debt outstanding, bank stockholders
have incentives to take on inefficient risk. How-
ever, the problem is more acute in commercial
banks, where stockholders are in addition sub-
ject to the distorting incentives arising from
the existence of fixed-price deposit insurance
premiums. These premiums result in a subsidy
to bank shareholders that increases in value with
the riskiness of the bank. Thus, bank share-
holders have even stronger incentives to take on
inefficiently risky investments that benefit them-
selves at the expense of the deposit insurance
fund and the taxpayers who back the fund.4
Competition in the product market can
play a role in reducing the extent to which
managers shirk from value maximization goals.
Together with thrifts, credit unions, and govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises, commercial banks
have traditionally had strong oligopolistic ad-
vantages on the liabilities side of their business—
the issuance of insured debt. This oligopolistic
position may have given banks the scope to be
more inefficient in some aspects of their busi-
ness—for example, in the degree to which
managers follow value-maximizing policies—
yet still be competitive with other financial insti-
tutions that have not had the benefit of issuing
liabilities backed by a federal guarantee. How-
ever, the advantages from issuing insured debt
for banks likely have declined over recent years
with the emergence of numerous good substi-
tutes, such as money market mutual funds.
Federal regulation and moral hazard
clearly play a role in shaping the corporate con-
trol mechanism that operates in banks and in
particular are likely to make it operate signifi-
cantly differently from the corporate control
mechanism at work in other firms. Nevertheless,
there is only a relatively small amount of litera-
ture, particularly of recent vintage, that attempts
to document empirically the existence of corpo-
rate control problems between bank sharehold-
ers and managers. Much of this work uses data
from the 1970s and earlier and thus has an
uncertain relevance to the banking industry as it
now is configured.5 Gorton and Rosen (1992) and
Allen and Cebenoyan (1991) both present evi-
dence on the behavior of commercial banks in
the 1980s that is consistent with a corporateFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 27 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1995
control problem. Allen and Cebenoyan find that
banks with entrenched management tend to en-
gage in the most active acquisition programs,
consistent with the view that such programs are
designed to increase the perquisites available to
management (which vary directly with the size
of the firm) rather than to increase profitability.
Gorton and Rosen present evidence that en-
trenched managers may be a more impor-
tant problem in banking than the moral hazard
associated with deposit insurance. The authors
find that banks that are characterized as having
managements that are relatively free from out-
side shareholder control make the riskiest and
most unprofitable investments.
While both Allen and Cebenoyan and Gor-
ton and Rosen find evidence of a corporate
control problem in banks in the 1980s, neither
study identifies the aspects of commercial banks’
corporate control mechanism that may be defi-
cient or why these deficiencies may occur. This
article attempts to provide an initial pass at such
an analysis by examining the frequency of differ-
ent types of corporate control change among
BHCs in the late 1980s and their relationship
with the ownership, board structure, and perfor-
mance of the BHC.
Data and empirical results
Frequency of corporate control changes.
I analyze the frequency with which corporate
control changes occur in a sample of BHCs over
the period 1987–92 and the relative importance
of those corporate control mechanisms that pre-
cipitate such action, such as hostile takeovers,
other mergers, internally driven board turnover
of the management team, and intervention by
regulators. To analyze the frequency of alterna-
tive control changes, I follow the Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1989) (MSV) method in their study
of Fortune 500 manufacturing firms.
I collected data on the following charac-
teristics of BHCs that existed in 1987: account-
ing data from COMPUSTAT (from 1987–92) and
stock return data from the CRSP tapes (from
1983–86). In addition, I collected data on the
composition of the BHC’s board of directors
between insiders and outsiders and their
shareholdings in 1987 and on the shareholdings
of greater than 5-percent owners of the BHC in
1987 from the 10–K, annual report, or other
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
filings. I was left with 234 BHCs in the sample,
including all the largest ones.
Of the 234 BHCs in the sample, twenty-
nine were acquired by third parties during 1987–
92, based upon an examination of Securities
Data Corp.’s Mergers and Acquisitions Database.
Four appear to have started as hostile takeovers
and twenty-five as friendly mergers. Following
MSV, I record an acquisition as hostile if the
initial bid for the target was unsolicited and not
accepted by the board in its initial form. Targets
that were not classified as hostile were recorded
as friendly. Hostile takeovers almost by defini-
tion involve changes in current management
and therefore can be viewed as a change in
corporate control. The degree to which friendly
mergers can be so regarded is somewhat more
doubtful. The fact that a friendly merger offer is
not contested by current management may
mean managers believe their jobs are secure.
However, this belief may not prove true. In any
case, the acquiring firm may keep current man-
agement but force it to make policy changes
that it otherwise would not have made. For
these reasons, I consider friendly mergers as
potential mechanisms of corporate control
change, although of a different nature than
hostile takeovers.
I attempt to classify those BHCs in my
sample that have experienced a top manage-
ment turnover. Again, following MSV, I define
management turnover as a complete change
between 1987–92 in the list of officers signing
the letter to shareholders in the annual report. A
BHC experiences a management turnover if
none of the officers who signed the annual
report in 1992 also signed five years earlier. I
consider such turnover to be the result of disci-
plinary management changes forced by the
board of directors.6 A BHC that has experienced
a management turnover prior to being acquired
is classified as an acquisition, not a turnover.
This happens in four cases, in each of which the
subsequent merger is friendly. As MSV note, while
the board is arguably trying to deal with man-
agement problems, the BHC’s subsequent acqui-
sition is evidence that the board’s action is not
providing an adequate solution. This definition
of top management turnover yields twenty-four
cases of management turnover.7
The final category of corporate control
change I consider is intervention by regulators.
Intervention may be viewed as a “last resort”
mechanism for those BHCs that may or may not
have undergone previous corporate control
changes yet have continued to perform poorly.
Each federal banking agency, as well as each
state banking authority, can impose a broad
range of enforcement actions on management.
Both formal and informal regulatory enforce-
ment actions are a response to poor perfor-
mance by the BHC in some aspect of its opera-28
tions. These actions involve directing current
management to attain specific capital ratios, sus-
pend dividends, rectify loan quality problems,
address liquidity and concentration problems,
and the like. They can therefore be seen as a
last-resort, nonmarket-based external mecha-
nism of management discipline.
Since some informal enforcement actions
are never made public, there is a problem in
identifying those BHCs that are subject to regula-
tory intervention.8 One solution would be to
use the BOPEC rating—the rating assigned to
the BHC by regulators—and to assume that
those BHCs rated unfavorably were subject to
some form of regulatory intervention.9 An
alternative is to use data on the bad loans out-
standing at BHCs. In this article, I construct the
regulatory intervention group by ranking my
sample of BHCs according to the percentage of
total assets that are in the form of nonperform-
ing or greater than ninety days past due loans.10
If a BHC was in the bottom decile of my sample
in any one year of the sample period, I assume
that BHC comes under regulatory intervention
starting in that year.11 This definition yields thirty-
three cases of regulatory intervention. BHCs that
underwent a management turnover before being
observed in the bottom decile of the bad loan
ratio are classified as being in the regulatory
intervention category, not the turnover category.
Again, the argument is that while the board may
be trying to deal with management problems,
subsequent intervention by regulators is evi-
dence that the board’s action is not an adequate
solution. This happens in six cases.
Table 1 lists the frequency of these various
corporate control events, with those of the MSV
study of manufacturing firms as a standard of
comparison. First note that, in terms of percent-
ages of the sample size, total corporate control
changes (defined to include intervention by
regulators for the BHC sample) appear to be
about as frequent among BHCs as they are
among manufacturing firms.12 However, the
composition of total control changes between
the various alternatives differs dramatically be-
tween the two groups. Market-based corporate
control changes (excluding control changes
owing to regulatory intervention) are about
two-thirds as frequent among the sample of
BHCs as they are for nonfinancial firms.13 If my
measure of the regulatory intervention group
does not overstate the number of BHCs subject
to regulatory intervention in this period, it
appears that the primary mechanism of cor-
porate control change among BHCs in this
period was in fact intervention by regulators.14
Looking at the relative frequency of the
market-based control mechanisms—which is
invariant to the size of the regulatory interven-
tion group—while friendly mergers are slightly
more frequent among the BHC sample, hostile
takeovers and management turnover are mark-
edly less frequent. For example, MSV record forty
hostile takeovers representing 8.8 percent of
their sample of nonfinancial firms. Similarly, 20.5
percent (ninety-three cases) of their sample un-
dergo an internally precipitated management
turnover. In my sample of BHCs, only 1.7 per-
cent (four cases) undergo a hostile takeover,
while 10.2 percent (twenty-four cases) of the
sample undergo a management turnover.15
Thus, hostile takeovers are over five times more
frequent among manufacturing firms than
among BHCs, confirming the conventional wis-
dom. In addition, however, management turn-
over by the board appears twice as frequent in
nonfinancial firms as in BHCs. Thus, the lower
frequency of hostile takeovers among BHCs
does not appear to be reflected in a greater
tendency by boards to remove management at
BHCs than at manufacturing firms.16 Indeed,
boards at BHCs appear to be less active in re-
moving management for disciplinary reasons.
The following sections attempt to shed
some light on these observations by examining
the characteristics of BHCs employing different
corporate control mechanisms.
Characteristics of firms subject to different
control changes. I focus on a number of perfor-
mance, ownership, and board characteristics of
BHCs, on the assumption that these variables
may determine which (if any) control devices are
used. Definitions and sources for these variables
are given in Table 2.
Table 1
Frequency of Alternative Corporate Control Changes
(Percent of total sample)
In MSV’s sample of 454 In 234 bank
manufacturing firms holding companies
Hostile takeover 8.8 1.7
Management turnover 20.5 10.2
Friendly merger 7.5 10.7
Market-based control changes 36.8 22.6
Regulatory intervention 0 14.1
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I use two different measures of perfor-
mance of the BHC under existing management:
stock market abnormal returns and a return on
equity accounting measure. The stock market
measure of performance (RETURN) is the
cumulative abnormal return over the period
1985–86, calculated using the capital asset pric-
ing model (CAPM) parameterized over the four-
year period 1983–86.17 The data for returns are
the standard monthly series from the CRSP tapes.
This performance measure is calculated over a
period prior to 1987 to avoid capturing any
effects of the market’s anticipations of future
corporate control changes. Doing so means it is
more likely that my measure is capturing the
market’s expectations of future profitability of
the BHC under current management, not the
expected premium from a control change. The
accounting performance measure (ROE) is the
average return on equity from COMPUSTAT
over the period 1987 to the date of any control
change, or 1992 if there were no control change.18
Since this is an accounting measure of perfor-
mance, there is no contamination from the mar-
ket’s expectations about future control changes
and thus no need to calculate the measure over
a period prior to 1987.
Ownership characteristics include the
equity holdings of insiders (INSIDE) and out-
siders (OUTSIDE) on the board of directors in
1987 as a percentage of total outstanding shares.
Equity holdings of insiders may proxy for the
entrenchment of current management and their
financial incentive to accept a friendly offer.
Outsider equity holdings proxy for the incentive
that outside board members have to perform
monitoring duties on current management. In-
siders are defined as those members of the board
who are also members of current management.
Outsiders are defined as those board members
who are not insiders and also not employees of
firms that may have business dealings with the
bank. Outsiders include primarily academics,
retirees who are not previous employees of the
bank, individuals, and those listed as chairmen
of investment groups with their own name.19 In
addition, the cumulative shareholdings—as a
percentage of outstanding shares—of those
shareholders holding greater than 5-percent
stakes in the BHC in 1987 are reported as large
shareholders’ holdings (LARGE). The greater a
large shareholder’s stakes in the company, the
greater his or her incentive to ensure that man-
agement is maximizing profits. These data are
obtained from 10–Ks, proxies, and other SEC
filings.
Management characteristics include a
dummy (FF) indicating whether any signer of
the annual report is from the founding family.
Top officer members of the founding family
were identified from old annual reports and
various editions of Who’s Who in American
Banking. Members of the founding family that
are part of the top management team may have
a special ability to resist challenges to their con-
trol even without a substantial ownership stake
by virtue of having handpicked the board over a
long period of time.20 In addition, following
MSV, I record a dummy variable (BOSS) indi-
cating if only one executive signs the annual
report and no other executive holds the title of
chairman, chief executive officer, or president of
the BHC. The BOSS variable tries to identify top
executives who either completely dominate the
management of the BHC or have no clear re-
placement and who therefore may be particu-
larly protected from disciplinary action by
the board. This variable is constructed from data
from the annual report.
Table 3 presents the means of performance
measures and ownership and board structure
characteristics for five categories of firms in my
sample. The first four categories include BHCs
that experienced one of the four types of corpo-
rate control change: management turnover, hos-
tile takeover, friendly acquisition, and regulatory
intervention. The fifth category includes the re-
maining (“no control change”) BHCs that did not
experience any control change. Asterisks indicate
the statistical significance of differences in the
means of the control change groups relative to
Table 2
Data Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition
RETURN Cumulative abnormal return, 1985–86, from the monthly CAPM,
estimated over 1983–86 (SOURCE: CRSP).
ROE Annual average return on equity, 1987 to year of control change or,
if no control change, to 1992 (SOURCE: COMPUSTAT).
INSIDE Equity stakes of insiders (current management team) on the board
of directors in 1987 as a percentage of total outstanding shares
(SOURCE: SEC filings).
OUTSIDE Equity stakes of outsiders on the board in 1987 as a percentage of
total outstanding shares (SOURCE: SEC filings).
LARGE Combined equity stake of greater than 5-percent shareholders in
1987 as a percentage of total outstanding shares (SOURCE: SEC
filings).
FF Dummy = 1 if any signer of the annual report is a member of the
founding family or of the family of a previous signer of the annual
report (SOURCE: annual reports, Who’s Who in American Banking).
BOSS Dummy = 1 if only one executive signs the annual report and no
other executive holds the title of chairman, CEO, or president
(SOURCE: annual reports).
SIZE Market value of equity in 1987 in millions of dollars (SOURCE:
COMPUSTAT).30
the no-control-change group.
Table 3 indicates that firms experiencing
management turnover or regulatory intervention
have abnormal stock market returns of –11.5
percent and –14.3 percent, respectively, in the
period 1985–86, compared with –1.9 percent for
firms experiencing no control change. Targets of
friendly bids have abnormal returns of +9.5 per-
cent, while targets of hostile bids have abnormal
returns of +5.3 percent. Each group’s perfor-
mance is statistically different from that of the
no-control-change group, except for the hostile
group.21 The same pattern of performance be-
tween corporate control groups is exhibited
when the measure of performance is ROE: BHCs
in the regulatory and management turnover
group show significantly poorer performance
than the no-control-change group, whereas
BHCs subject to a friendly merger show signifi-
cantly better performance than the no-change
group. Performance in the hostile takeover group
is not statistically significantly different from
that of the no-control-change group.
As expected, performance is relatively
poor among those BHCs that ultimately undergo
either management turnover or regulatory in-
tervention. While the motivation for regulatory
action makes this result for the regulatory group
almost a truism, it is also clear that boards of
banks do respond, however weakly, to poor
performance.
The finding that both the stock market and
accounting measures of performance are signifi-
cantly better at BHCs that undergo a friendly
merger than at those undergoing no control
change suggests that the motivation for such
mergers may not be the expectation of better
performance resulting from a change in poor
managerial policy. Mergers may, for example, be
more motivated by the acquirer’s desire to diver-
sify operations across state lines or capitalize
upon another bank’s customer base. In these
cases, BHCs may look for potential targets that fit
their desire to diversify but that are already
performing well and do not require the bidder to
engage in the costly process of restructuring the
bank’s operations and turning the bank around.
Table 3 also suggests that size matters
in determining the type of corporate control
change. For obvious reasons, it appears easier
to acquire smaller BHCs, either through friendly
merger or hostile takeover.
Table 3
Performance, Management, and Ownership Characteristic Means
By Control Outcome in 234 Bank Holding Companies
Management Hostile Friendly Regulatory No control
turnover takeover merger intervention change
Number of BHCs 22 4 25 33 150
Performance
RETURN –11.5%* 5.3% 9.5%*** –14.3%* –1.9%
ROE 5.1%* 12.2% 13.8%*** .2%*** 10.2%
Firm size (in millions of dollars)
SIZE 630.2 354.1* 438.1* 909.2 717.4
Ownership structure
LARGE 15.1% 38.2%* 15.9% 11.7%* 15.0%
OUTSIDE 1.8%* 1.0% 1.2% .4%* .9%
INSIDE 2.9%* 1.2%** 5.0% 2.6%* 4.4%
Management characteristics (zero-one dummies)
Family founder on
management team (FF ) .09* 0 .11 .04* .15
One-person management
team (BOSS) .10* .25 .26 .23 .17
*, **, and *** indicate means are significantly different from the no-control-change category at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and
1-percent levels, respectively.
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The equity stakes of large shareholders,
board insiders, and board outsiders are all lower
in those BHCs that undergo regulatory inter-
vention than those that do not experience a
control change, consistent with the notion that
smaller equity stakes lead to lower incentives to
ensure the success of the firm or react to poor
performance by changing management or man-
agement policies.
Equity stakes held by board outsiders are
higher and stakes held by board insiders are
lower in BHCs that undergo management turn-
over relative to the no-control-change BHCs. This
is consistent with the notion that board insiders
in these firms are less entrenched and board
outsiders more determined to enact change in
response to signs of poor performance. In addi-
tion, the finding of higher equity stakes held by
insiders in BHCs that were the target of friendly
offers relative to no-control-change BHCs is
consistent with the notion that insiders with large
equity stakes may have financial incentives to
acquiesce to merger offers that do not involve
their immediate removal.
The zero-one dummy variable FF has a
mean value of 0.09 for a BHC experiencing a
management turnover, versus 0.15 for a BHC
experiencing no control change. In other words,
a BHC that undergoes a management turnover
is about 60 percent as likely to have a member
of the founding family in a top management
position than a no-control-change BHC. Simi-
larly, no BHC that experienced a hostile take-
over had a member of the founding family as a
member of top management. Family founders
may be more entrenched managers because
they typically have higher equity stakes and also
have had influence over the selection of the
board over a long period of time.
Similarly, BHCs that experience a man-
agement turnover are about 60 percent as likely
to be run by a one-person management team (a
BOSS) as a no-control-change BHC. In contrast,
targets of hostile takeovers and friendly mergers
are about 1.5 times more likely to be run by
one-person management teams than no-change
BHCs. BHCs that undergo regulatory interven-
tion are also more likely (about 1.35 times) to be
run by a BOSS.22
This evidence suggests that ownership and
board structure are important in determining the
form of corporate control change. Although the
scarcity of hostile takeovers in the sample makes
it difficult to identify specific characteristics of
BHCs more likely to be subject to a hostile
takeover, it is easier to identify distinguishing
characteristics of BHCs in the three other corpo-
rate control change groups. For example, Table 3
suggests that management teams of those BHCs
that own large equity stakes, consist of family
founders and/or one-person management
teams, and whose outside directors hold rela-
tively small equity stakes may be entrenched
enough to avoid internal discipline by their board
of directors.23 In addition, those BHCs for which
market-based corporate control mechanisms fail
to operate and that thus become subject to
intervention by regulators clearly exhibit lower
ownership concentration by large equity holders
and by inside and outside board members.
Market-based measures of corporate control may
fail in these cases because there is no agent in
management, on the board, or among share-
holders that has a large enough equity stake to
provide adequate incentives to monitor the per-
formance of the BHC and take appropriate ac-
tion when performance begins to deteriorate.
The following section investigates whether
these conclusions are robust to multivariate
analysis.
Multivariate analysis of corporate control
changes. I present four-choice logit estimates of
the determinants of the form of control change.
The four choices are complete management
turnover, friendly merger, regulatory interven-
tion, and no control change. I delete the hostile
takeover choice from my universe since there
are so few of these observations (four) in the
sample. Table 4 presents the multinomial logit
models for two different specifications using
two different measures of performance (RETURN
and ROE), along with measures of inside board
ownership (INSIDE), large shareholder owner-
ship (LARGE), the natural log of BHC size (LN
SIZE), and whether there was a one-person
management team in place (BOSS).24 In each
case, the coefficients on the variables for the no-
control-change group are normalized to zero.
Table 5 presents the implied probabilities from
the logits for the specification using ROE as a
measure of performance.25
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that
using either return on equity (ROE) or abnormal
stock return (RETURN ) as a measure of per-
formance, relative to the probability of being a
no-control-change BHC, the probability of top
management turnover is higher when the BHC
is not run by a one-person management team,
when board insiders hold smaller equity stakes,
and when the return on equity is lower. The log
odds of a management turnover versus no out-
come is not significantly affected by the size of
the firm or by the combined equity stakes of
all greater than 5-percent shareholders. In terms32
of probabilities, column 1 of Table 5 indicates
that—starting from a “base case” in which LN
SIZE and BOSS are set equal to their mean and
INSIDE, LARGE, and ROE are set equal to their
medians—when  ROE falls to the top of its
lowest quartile, the estimated probability of a
management turnover rises from 11.7 percent to
16.1 percent.26 The estimated probability drops
from 11.7 percent to 7.4 percent in the presence
of a BOSS, whereas it rises to 14.5 percent in
the absence of a BOSS. Similarly, the estimated
probability of a management turnover rises
from 11.7 percent to 14.6 percent as the insider
equity stake falls from its median to the top of
its lowest quartile.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 show that the
log odds of a friendly acquisition relative to no
outcome are significantly negatively related to
the size of the BHC but to nothing else. In par-
ticular, the existence of a one-person manage-
ment team, board insider, and large shareholder
equity stake, and both measures of bank perfor-
mance (ROE or RETURN ) have no statistically
significant influence on the log odds of a friendly
acquisition relative to no control change.
Consistent with the earlier evidence from
the univariate analysis, columns 5 and 6 of
Table 4 show that the log odds of regulatory
intervention versus no outcome increase with
the size of the firm and decrease with the equity
stakes of insiders and large shareholders. As one
might expect, the odds of regulatory intervention
also increase with poorer performance as meas-
ured by ROE or RETURN. Column 3 of Table 5
implies that, of these factors, the strongest effects
lie in the extent to which large shareholders
and insiders own big stakes in the BHC. Starting
at the base case, the probability of regulatory
intervention increases from 15.6 percent to 22.5
percent as the equity stake held by large share-
holders falls from its median value to the top of
its lowest quartile value. The probability of regu-
latory intervention increases from 15.6 percent
to 23.4 percent as the equity stake held by in-
siders falls from its median to the top of its lowest
quartile.
Conclusions
In this article, I explore the effectiveness of
various corporate control mechanisms in the
banking industry. My analysis suggests that
while the market-based mechanisms of cor-
porate control in BHCs appear to operate in the
same broad fashion as in manufacturing firms,
there may be weaknesses in the effectiveness of
two aspects of the corporate control mecha-
nism in BHCs: hostile takeovers and interven-
tion by the board of directors. These weaknesses
Table 4
Multinomial Logit Models of Control Outcomes
Management turnover Friendly merger Regulatory intervention
INTERCEPT .05 .15 –.11 –.20 –1.36 –1.63
(.20) (.38) (.31) (.38) (1.4) (1.5)
LN SIZE –.03 –.04 –.09* –.07* .035* .04*
(.54) (.80) (1.7) (1.7) (1.8) (1.8)
BOSS –6.2* –.53* –.06 –.06 –.03 –.06
(1.9) (1.8) (.62) (.56) (.19) (.32)
INSIDE –.09** –.07* .001 –.001 –.07*** –.04*
(2.3) (1.7) (.18) (.21) (3.1) (1.7)
LARGE .004 .005 –.003 –.003 –.02*** –.01*
(1.4) (1.5) (1.1) (.88) (2.8) (1.8)
ROE –.09*** — .004 — –.02*** —
(3.6) (1.0) (2.7)
RETURN — –.35** — .01 — –.04**
(2.6) (.15) (2.3)
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels, respectively.
NOTE: Coefficients on the regression on no-control-change BHCs are normalized to zero.
Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 33 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1995
may make the corporate control problem in
banking more severe than in nonbank sectors.
My analysis confirms the conventional
wisdom that hostile takeovers do not play an
important role in disciplining management in
BHCs. I found little evidence of the disciplinary
role of friendly mergers, which appeared to take
place primarily among BHCs that were per-
forming well. This result suggests that the main
motivation for friendly acquisitions may be for
reasons other than disciplining current manage-
ment to increase shareholder value. If so, the
primary responsibility for disciplining managers
at BHCs rests with boards of directors.
Boards of BHCs (like those of manufactur-
ing firms) do appear to respond to poor perfor-
mance. Both the univariate and multivariate
analysis imply that poor performance increases
the probability the board will discipline current
management. Overall, however, boards appear
to be less assertive in their corporate govern-
ance responsibilities than in manufacturing
firms. Board-induced turnover of current man-
agement in my sample of BHCs is half as frequent
as in MSV’s sample of manufacturing firms.27
Why might this be the case? Recall that,
like boards of manufacturing firms, bank boards
appear weaker in disciplining management
when managers are entrenched because of rela-
tively high levels of insider ownership or low
levels of board outsider ownership, or when
one-person management teams are in place.
Thus, management may be more insulated from
board action in banks if bank managers hold
more equity than do managers at nonbanks, if
one-person management teams are more fre-
quent among BHCs than they are among non-
banks, or if outside board member ownership is
lower at banks. The evidence suggests that at least
the first two factors cannot explain the weakness
of bank boards. One-person management teams
appear no more frequent among BHCs than
among manufacturing firms. In MSV’s sample of
manufacturing firms, one-person management
teams occur with a frequency of 23.3 per-
cent, while they occur with a frequency of 19.7
percent in my sample of BHCs. Similarly, insider
equity stakes do not appear larger in banks than
in nonfinancial firms. Byrd and Hickman (1992)
report that the mean and median insider equity
stakes for their sample of nonfinancial firms are
10.9 percent and 2 percent, respectively, com-
pared with 4.1 percent and 1.3 percent for my
sample of BHCs.
Outside directors, however, do appear to
take larger stakes in nonfinancial firms than in
banks, judging by a comparison with the Byrd
and Hickman study. They found the mean and
median equity stake held by board outsiders in
their sample of firms was 2 percent and 0.08
percent, respectively, compared with 1 percent
and 0.05 percent for my sample of BHCs. Thus,
boards conceivably may be weaker in banks
because outside directors hold less equity and are
presumably less motivated to impose discipli-
nary measures on management.
Whatever the reason for weaker boards
among BHCs, when combined with the regula-
tory impediments to hostile takeovers, weaker
boards may contribute to a corporate govern-
ance mechanism in banks that is not as efficient
at disciplining managers as those mechanisms in
other sectors. For example, MSV found that cor-
porate boards were particularly weak in remov-
ing unresponsive managers in manufacturing
firms that were in declining sectors and that
required radical downsizing and restructuring.
In these sectors, the restructuring function was
primarily performed by hostile takeovers. MSV
term this situation a third-best solution, on the
grounds that internal control devices are inher-
ently cheaper to operate and more conducive to
long-term planning than are hostile takeovers.
In the banking industry, however, while boards
are even weaker than in manufacturing sectors,
the use of hostile takeovers as an important
method of restructuring is also ruled out. By
default, this void has given regulators a primary
role in providing a last-resort control mecha-
nism—what might be termed a fourth-best
solution since takeover by regulators is almost
certainly far more costly than any market-based
alternative.
Table 5




Base case* .117 .095 .156
BOSS present .074 .096 .158
No BOSS present .145 .094 .152
ROE at top of
lowest quartile .161 .088 .157
LARGE at top of
lowest quartile .110 .095 .225
INSIDE at top of
lowest quartile .146 .088 .234
*Base case is from the first specification in Table 4 where LN SIZE and BOSS are estimated at their
means for the entire sample, and LARGE, INSIDE, and ROE are at their medians. The rows follow-
ing the base case are estimated probabilities evaluated at various points, differing from the base
case only in the value of the indicated independent variable.34
These results suggest that policymakers
should take corporate control issues seriously
when considering legislative alternatives to the
current system of bank regulation and organiza-
tion. In particular, the finding that banks that
have undergone regulatory intervention have
markedly lower ownership concentration than
other banks suggests that higher ownership con-
centration among banks might improve perfor-
mance by motivating greater oversight and
monitoring by large stakeholders and their rep-
resentatives on the board of directors. If so,
current restrictions on potential owners of com-
mercial banks may have costs. Some of the pro-
posed banking legislation in Congress could also
be evaluated in this light, since different pro-
posals vary quite substantially in the degree to
which they relax the current restrictions on per-
missible bank owners.
In addition, the absence of a credible take-
over threat among banks appears to have a
marked influence on the effectiveness of the
corporate control mechanism operating in
banks. While regulators have been careful not
to discriminate actively against bank mergers on
the basis of whether they are hostile or not,
the long regulatory process that all bank mer-
gers have to go through tends to make hostile
takeovers much more difficult to achieve than
friendly mergers. This suggests that there may
be beneficial effects on the corporate control
mechanism in banks from removing some of the
more obvious obstacles to hostile takeovers in
banking by, for example, relaxing interstate bank-
ing regulations and increasing the speed with
which regulators process merger applications.
Notes
I thank Allen Berger, Mark Carey, Sally Davies, Harvey
Rosenblum, Myron Kwast, Tom Siems, and Jim Thomson
for comments and useful conversations, and Ed Ettin
for suggesting this line of research. I also thank
Rebecca Menes for extraordinary diligence in collect-
ing the data and Jim Yeatts for research assistance.
1 For some documentation of these trends, see Gorton
and Rosen (1992). Note that the claim that the banking
industry is in decline is by no means universally
accepted. On this issue, see Boyd and Gertler (1994),
Levonian (1995), Kaufman and Mote (1994), and
articles in the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (1994).
2 See, for example, Ely (1992).
3 See Keeley (1990) and McManus and Rosen (1991).
4 Risk-based deposit insurance premiums were intro-
duced by a provision of the FDIC Improvement Act in
1993. This change does not affect my empirical results
since my sample period ends in 1992.
5 See, for example, Edwards (1977), Glassman and
Rhoades (1980), Hannan and Mavinga (1980),
Smirlock and Marshall (1983), James (1984), and
Brickley and James (1987).
6 Following MSV, I focus on complete rather than partial
turnover of the signers of the annual report over a five-
year period because I am interested in disciplinary
management changes forced by the board. Most of
the changes in which one cosigner of the annual report
replaces another (partial turnover) likely represent
ordinary succession rather than disciplinary action by
the board. Of course, counting as disciplinary turnover
all cases where the list of signers in 1987 was com-
pletely different from the list in 1992 may include some
cases where there were two or more ordinary succes-
sions (partial turnovers) within the five-year period that
resulted in none of the 1987 signers being signers in
1992. This multiple partial turnover phenomenon, in
fact, occurs in only two cases in my sample. When
making comparisons with the frequencies reported by
MSV, I count these two cases as management turnover
in order to maintain consistency with MSV’s definition.
I do not count these cases as management turnover in
the remainder of this article.
7 There are twenty-two when the two multiple partial
turnover cases are excluded.
8 Enforcement actions can be formal or informal. Formal
actions range from cease and desist orders to civil
money penalties on managers and directors. Formal
actions are regulators’ most severe forms of action and
are always made public by regulators. Informal actions
range from commitment letters—which set forth the
reforms the BHC needs and the time frame within
which those reforms are to be achieved—to memoran-
dums of understanding, a document drafted by
regulators and signed by every member of the BHC
board. Informal actions are not made public by the
regulatory authorities. In some but not every case,
informal actions will be disclosed by the BHC itself if it
is making a security offering and the enforcement
action is deemed to be material information to potential
investors. See Rockett (1994).
9 The composite BOPEC rating reflects evaluations on a
scale from 1 (strongest) to 5 (weakest) and is arrived
at by combining the individual ratings assigned to the
BHC in five different component areas (each of which
contributes a letter to the acronym BOPEC); namely,
the Bank subsidiaries, Other nonbank subsidiaries, the
Parent company, the level of consolidated Earnings,
and the level of Capital adequacy. As such, the
BOPEC rating system for BHCs is structured very
much like the CAMEL rating system for individual
banks. The decision to impose specific enforcement
actions generally depends on the composite BOPEC
rating the institution receives in its periodic examina-
tion by regulators. If an examination results in a com-
posite BOPEC rating of 3 or below, then the BHC is
likely to require “more than normal” supervision by theFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 35 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1995
regulatory authorities (see Federal Reserve Regulatory
Service, vol. 2, paragraph 4-865).
10 Except where noted, the results using the BOPEC
ratings to construct the regulatory intervention group
are qualitatively similar to those presented here.
11 Such were the problems of banks during 1989–91 that
falling in the bottom quintile of the sample may have
been sufficient to trigger some regulatory intervention.
Again, except where noted, the results using the
bottom quintile of the sample as the regulatory inter-
vention group are qualitatively similar to those pre-
sented here.
12 Of course, this is in part an artifact of my definition of
the regulatory intervention category for BHCs as con-
stituting those BHCs that appear in the bottom decile
of the sample ranked by the bad loan ratio. Defining
the regulatory intervention group as the bottom quintile
of firms ranked by this measure, or alternatively, by
those BHCs with a BOPEC rating of 3 or below during
the sample period, increases the number of BHCs in
the regulatory intervention group substantially.
13 Of course, comparing frequencies of total corporate
changes assumes that firms in the two samples are
subject to the same degree of corporate control
problems ex ante the use of corporate control mecha-
nisms considered in the article. In other words, that
management is being disciplined to the same extent
by other corporate control mechanisms not considered
here, such as pay-for-performance compensation
packages and competition in product markets. On this
point, Houston and James (1993) present evidence
that the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance is
significantly lower in banks than among nonbanks.
This finding, combined with the traditional partial
insulation from competition in product markets that
banks enjoy owing to their ability to issue insured
liabilities, suggests that the need for the corporate
control mechanisms considered in this article may be
greater in banking than in other industries.
14 In fact, as mentioned earlier, alternative plausible
definitions of the regulatory intervention group yield a
much larger number of BHCs in this group.
15 My measure of turnover here includes the two previ-
ously noted cases of multiple partial turnover in order
to maintain consistency with the definition used by MSV.
16 Houston and James (1993) use a different measure of
management turnover and find that management
turnover in banks is somewhat less than in a sample of
nonbanks but that the differences are not statistically
significant.
17 I restrict myself to the period 1983–86 to parameterize
the CAPM because Kane and Unal (1988) identify a
break in the return-generating process for banks in
1982 related to changes in the regulatory and financial
environment of banks during that year.
18 ROE is defined as income before extraordinary items
divided by common equity.
19 This follows Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Byrd
and Hickman (1992), who define an outsider more
narrowly than just those who are not insiders.
20 For this reason, I set FF = 1 for those BHCs for which
a signer of the annual report was related to an immedi-
ate previous signer of the annual report, regardless of
whether the signer was a member of the founding family.
21 Since the hostile takeover group consists of only four
BHCs, it is hard to get statistically significant differ-
ences between it and the no-control-change group in
all but a few variables. Nevertheless, the higher
abnormal return posted for this group may reflect
some contamination from investors’ expectations of a
future control change.
22 Note, however, that these last two differences are not
statistically significant.
23 These are essentially the conclusions of MSV from their
analysis of a sample of manufacturing firms.
24 A number of other specifications were tried. The family
founder dummy (FF) showed the same sign and signifi-
cance pattern as the INSIDE variable when used in the
specification in place of INSIDE. When included together
with the INSIDE variable, FF became insignificant.
25 The implied probabilities for the alternative measure
of performance—abnormal returns—were little
different from those presented here.
26 I must start from a set of initial conditions—a “base”
case—since the marginal effects of the regressors
upon the implied probabilities in a multinomial logit
model depend upon the initial values of all the inde-
pendent variables. See Maddala (1983).
27 One manifestation of this weakness may be in the fact
that boards of BHCs are about 50 percent larger than
boards of nonfinancial firms. The mean number of
directors in my sample of BHCs is 18, compared with
12.1 for Byrd and Hickman’s (1992) sample of non-
financial firms. Large boards are likely more unwieldy
and less capable of responding quickly to manage-
ment problems. If members of management realize
this, then they may seek to entrench themselves by
increasing the size of the board.
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